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Got the picture? Image, image
schemata, imaginative reason
Jean-Rémi Lapaire
1 Eight1 weeks after the successful launch of the Euro – the common European currency –
Tony Blair pledged that he would speed up the process of monetary union. In the editor’s
own words, this amounted to “prodding the British a little more quickly up the monetary
aisle.”
 
Figure 1. “Nearer to the altar” in The Economist Feb 27th – March 5th 1999
2 The standard dictionary definition of a cartoon is “a humorous drawing dealing in a
clever and amusing way with something of interest in the news.” 
3 As all readers of newspapers and magazines know, the best cartoons are those that blend
visual and verbal language to expose some crucial moral, social or political truth. Success
largely depends on the cartoonist’s ability to create a conceptually accurate, thought-
provoking and entertaining situation.  But  how does one ‘provoke’  thought using the
limited resources of a highly simplified and conventionalized pictographic vocabulary?
How can one “entertain” the bored, skeptical or merely indifferent reader with a minor
episode  in  the  dull  financial  saga  of  European  monetary  integration?  How  can  a
thoroughly unrealistic scene capture the essence of reality? How come we make so much
sense of such pictorial nonsense? 
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Cognitive semantics may have some answers. 
4 As  a  relatively  new  discipline  in  the  emergent  field  of  cognitive  science,  cognitive
semantics  studies  the  way  we  categorize,  conceptualize  and  reason.  It  identifies
knowledge structures and explores common modes of understanding. In Mark Johnson’s
words,
It is a program of empirical research in linguistics, psychology, philosophy, and the
other cognitive sciences that stresses the embodied and imaginative character of
human cognition. (1993: 265-66).
5 To a cognitive linguist,  cartoons are certainly among the most powerful revealers of
human conceptual structures and projections. Nowhere else is “the imaginative structure
of  human  understanding”  (Johnson  1993)  more  apparent.  Nowhere  else  is  the
organization of knowledge into shared sociocultural frames more visible. Nowhere else
are the central cognitive mechanisms known as mapping and blending more accessible.
 
1. Conceptual “connections”, “projections” and
“blends”
1.1. Mapping
6 A connection is set up between two distinct domains: 
1. the conventional Christian wedding ceremony [which constitutes ‘the source domain’]
2. European monetary integration [‘the target domain’]
7 As in any cartoon, the connection is both visual and conceptual. The reader is expected to
engage  in  ‘visual  thinking’  (Arnheim  1969)  –  an  experience  which  fuses  image  and
concept, perception and intellection. 
8 We look and think at the same time;  processing visual  data and negotiating meaning
simultaneously.  In  this  particular  cartoon,  image  processing  and  meaning  construal
require projecting shared cultural knowledge about marriage onto monetary union. This
is called a ‘source-to-target mapping’, where ‘marriage’ acts as the ‘source’ or ‘trigger’
and monetary union as the ‘target’. 
 
Figure 2. Mapping
9 Mapping is  a  cognitive  process  which transfers  both ‘form’  and ‘substance’,  i.e.,  the
semiotic coding and its associated conceptual structure. 
10 Several key notions need to be defined before pursuing the discussion: 
a. “projection” requires activation: the projected conceptual structure (e.g., our knowledge of
marriage as a cultural institution and a codified social performance) becomes a dynamic
processing  medium.  It  no  longer  lies  dormant,  as  a  static  mental  configuration.  Our
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understanding of the political statement made by the cartoon requires that pre-structured
knowledge pertaining to “holy matrimony” should become cognitively active.
b. a wedding ceremony is a ritual which follows a particular script. It has far-reaching social,
moral and legal consequences for the bride and the groom. It is part of a well-established
cognitive frame (cf.  the wedding entry in Longman Dictionary of  English Language and Culture
1998: 804). 
c. some typical aspects of the standard wedding script have been left out. We see no mothers,
no brothers, no sisters, no friends, no flower girls, no pageboy! This is by no means unusual.
In most –if not all– source-to-target mappings, only part of the source domain is activated to
conceptualize the target domain. 
d. additional characters and props could be called into the picture if the metaphor were to be
elaborated further. Currencies from Commonwealth countries —like the Australian Dollar—
might act as caring friends taking pictures during the ceremony or preparing confetti and
rice. Later, bride and groom might be seen travelling as backpackers on a crowded Eurobus;
the honeymoon trip being slightly rougher than expected.  Alternatively,  we might have
caught a glimpse of the disastrous wedding night and failed “dream vacation” in Bora Bora:
the Euro plays golf  with his  business partners —the arrogant Yen and the fat  American
F0
BCDollar— while the disillusioned and homesick Pound calls up her relatives and sobs
e. the mapping is used to highlight meaningful (or relevant) aspects of monetary union. The
message  here  is  “This  may  look  like  a  happy  occasion,  but  beware!  The  moment  ‘she’
marries the Euro, the pound will lose her maiden name and forsake her independence.”
11 Other  stories  might  have  sent  a  different  message,  simply  because  the  visual
conceptualization of the event would have been achieved via a different metaphorical
mapping. Tony Blair might have been featured as a baker adding “Sterling topping” to a
gigantic  “European Currency  cake.”  Among possible  developments,  a  threatening  US
dollar might have been shown lurking in the background, ready to devour the tasty,
creamy, Sterling-topped Eurocake.
12 Countless tales could be invented, using the boundless resources of imaginative reason:
We human beings are imaginative creatures, from our most mundane, automatic
acts  of  perception  all  the  way  up  to  our  more  abstract  conceptualization  and
reasoning. (Johnson 1993, 1997: ix)
 
1.2. Blending
13 Source-to-target mappings offer a useful, manageable yet incomplete representation of
conceptual transfers. The simple, direct, one-way projection of knowledge described in
1.1.  could be regarded as a simplified account of a more complex mental mechanism
involving a minimum of two input spaces and two middle spaces (Fauconnier & Turner
1994):
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Figure 2. Blending
14 Mental  spaces  (Fauconnier  1984,  1994,  1997)  should  not  be  confused  with  general
conceptual domains. In Fauconnier and Turner’s model, mental spaces are the particular
knowledge structures set up to achieve a particular conceptual projection. Although their
internal configuration borrows structure from general conceptual domains (e.g., “holy
matrimony”;  “monetary integration”)  they also inherit  structure from the situational
context (e.g., Tony Blair’s personal record on a common European monetary policy; the
reluctance  of  the  British  electorate  to  relinquish  more  sovereignty  to  a  handful  of
Frankfurt-based Eurobankers, etc.).
15 Mental  spaces  are  “indispensable  sites  for  central  mental  and  linguistic  work”
(Fauconnier  1994:  4).  As  shown  on  the  diagram,  they  are  interconnected  and
interdependent.  Each space makes a contribution to the overall  conceptual structure.
Hence the replacement of source and target domain by input 1 and input 2.
16 The “generic space” and the “blended space” are “middle spaces”. The first motivates the
conceptual connection between the “input spaces”, while the second allows the creation
of a new, imaginary setting.
 
1.2.1. The GENERIC SPACE
17 The connection between the input spaces is never random. Some amount of structure
must be common to both domains. This is known as the “principle of access” (Sweetser &
Fauconnier 1996). 
[…] an expression which names or describes one entity (the trigger) can be used to
access (and hence refer to) an entity in another domain (the target) only if the
second  domain  is  cognitively  accessible  from  the  first,  and  if  there  is  a
connection between trigger and target. (Fauconnier 1994: 7) [emphasis added]
18 The “generic space” covers the area of conceptual overlap, structural similarities and
shared sociophysical properties between the two input spaces:
The  generic  space  reflects  some  common,  usually  more  abstract,  structure  and
organization shared by  the  inputs  and defines  the  core  cross-mapping between
them. (Fauconnier 1997: 149) 
19 Holy matrimony [= input space 1] is used to “access” monetary integration [= input space
2] by virtue of its shared roles, frames and schemas:
• the  link  schema (Johnson 1987).  Two distinct  entities  are  joined together,  as  reflected in
common linguistic usage: the bride and groom are united in holy matrimony [input 1]; joining
the Euro zone is part of the process of monetary union [input 2].
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• the union is a formal agreement: documents are signed which are legally binding to both
parties. Marriage [input 1] and monetary union [input 2] are strictly codified transactions.
• preliminary  negotiations  are  needed.  This  is  usually  performed  in  private  but  the  final
agreement is public.
• powerful male figures traditionally control the event: the bride’s father [holy matrimony];
the prime minister or the Chancellor of the Exchequer [monetary union]. 
• the  bride  and  the  pound  are  in  focus  during  the  ceremony.  But  as  soon  as  the  legal
documents are signed, they will (a) lose control of their own destiny (b) recede into the
background.
 
1.2.2. The BLENDED SPACE
20 As Fauconnier remarks “Humor makes abundant use of blends” (1997: 185). ‘Nearer to the
Altar’ does more than support this statement: it provides a perfect example of visual
blending.
21 Technically, blending is a “merging operation” which “combines specifics from source
and target,  yielding an impression of  richer,  and often counterfactual  or ‘impossible’
structure” (Fauconnier & Turner 1994: 5).
22 In ‘Nearer to the Altar’, the pound is featured as a shy bride and the Euro poses as an
independent,  slightly  arrogant  bridegroom.  Social  life  and  financial  mechanisms  are
visually  merged.  The  scene  is  totally  unrealistic  but  its  ‘impossible’  nature  does  not
prevent it from being visually explicit. Strange as it may seem, it is the very imaginary
(Johnson) or ‘counterfactual’ (Fauconnier) nature of the visual blend that enhances its
conceptual clarity.
23 Blending obeys a set of consistent rules listed in Fauconnier 1997 (150-54). Three of these
deserve special mention here:
1. “The blend remains hooked up to the inputs.”
24 To make sense of the visual blend created by the cartoonist, mental contact must be kept
with the two spaces associated with ‘holy matrimony’ and ‘monetary union’. The reader
has a foot  in both spaces and must adjust  visually and conceptually to the available
‘background structures and inferences’ of the two domains.
2. “The blend has emergent structure not provided by the inputs. [T]he projections
from the inputs make new relations available that did not exist in the separate
inputs.”
25 In the typical wedding ceremony [input space 1] the father does not push his daughter up
the aisle to speed up the ceremony. But in the financial process of monetary union [input
space 2], the Prime Minister may indeed push reform and speed up the integration of the
Pound into the Euro zone. 
26 It is important to note that the blend inherits its causal and intentional structures from
input 2, but visually translates it in terms of input 1. 
27 Input 1 provides the concrete structure of church, altar,  priest,  ring, etc.,  and this is
exactly what makes the cartoon so amusing. The conventional expectations associated
with the wedding script are not fulfilled: we expect to see a slow-paced and dignified
father but find a somewhat panicked,  dishevelled-looking man who seems to be in a
terrible rush to marry his daughter.
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3. “The structure in the blend can be elaborated. This is ‘running the blend’. It
consists  in  cognitive  work  performed  within  the  blend,  according  to  its  own
emergent logic.”
28 Running the blend is exactly what we did when we imagined additional characters and
possible sequels (e.g., the honeymoon trip on a crowded Eurobus, etc. See 1.1.].
29 The possibilities afforded by blending are immense. Some sharp, business-oriented minds
have known this for a while and have already capitalized on the potential gains.  For
instance, the computer specialists who designed the Macintosh desktop interface were
aware that ordinary folks found standard keyboard commands frightening. It took huge
amounts of patience and optimism to master the daunting task of deleting, pasting, copying,
editing, saving on a computer until the late 1980’s. Special, algebraic coding was required
to perform the most basic operations. 
30 What  the  computer  people  were  clever  enough  to  realize  is  that  we  all  had  some
rudimentary  knowledge  of  regular  office  work,  with  pen,  paper,  eraser,  desk,  files,
folder… and trash can. Using icons, pointers, animation and familiar sound effects, they
found a way of transferring some of that firsthand knowledge and experience onto the
computer screen. They invented a blended space where one could “recruit with little
effort the conceptual structure of office work to operate computer commands”. They
replaced  the  old,  abstruse  numerical  codes  with  congenial  icons  for  files,  folders,
programs, etc. Much of the logic of office work was thus mapped onto computer work,
with immediate success. 
31 Yet, the motor actions performed at the “user friendly” computer desk – like using a
“mouse” and “clicking” – have little to do with the real motor actions found in ordinary
writing, erasing, carbon-copying, etc. The blended space of the Macintosh or Windows 2000
interface  is  a  world  governed  by  its  own  rules.  It  has  its  “emergent  structure”.  As
computer users, we “run the blend” every day. We normally do this with a fair amount of
success. But sometimes, there are cruel reminders of the cognitive gap separating the
traditional desktop from the modern computer station. When we use a pen, we do not
need to “save” what we have just written. Marks are marks and normally stay where they
are (for some time at least!). Erasing is a conscious and voluntary act. But this is not so
when we use a word-processor. On exiting a file, we normally get a message asking us to
confirm that we really want to “save” the work that we have done. If we overlook the
instruction or click in the wrong place, we may discover to our cost that words on a
computer screen are ethereal, self-deleting creatures.
32 All things considered, the modern, mercantile concept of “user-friendliness” means little
else than cognitively accessible.
 
2. Narration as a conceptualizing device 
33 There is  a  universal  tendency to make sense of  human action by applying narrative
structure to real world events. Lawyers and lexicographers may conceive of marriage as
‘the legal union made by a man and a woman to live as husband and wife’. But to most of
us, marriage is one of life’s many stories. 
34 Marriage  is  commonly  conceptualized  in  terms  of  a  boy  meets  girl  story with plot, 
character and role assignment. So is monetary union, which may be construed as a pound
meets Euro story, with Tony Blair cast as the bride’s father in the conventional marriage
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script. Other plots could be used to frame the same reality. The more primitive genre of
the epic would be particularly appropriate here, with the Prime Minister engaging in a
heroic battle against the evil Eurosceptics. 
35 That  harsh,  unromantic  financial  processes  should assume  story  form  is  hardly
surprising. Many subjects, including the most technical ones – virus infections, nuclear
fission, computer programmin… – resort to narrative as a conceptualizing device. It is no
coincidence  that  Christ  spoke  in  parables  to  conceptualize  moral  truths.  It  is  no
coincidence either that Freud imported Greek myths – in particular the Oedipus story –
not  only  to  describe  but  to  conceptualize neurosis.  Interestingly,  his  case  studies  are
narratives which dramatize emotional and representational processes. 
36 In Mark Johnson’s words, “we are narrative creatures” (1997: 180). Not only do we give
narrative accounts of ourselves, but we are for ever engaged in the narrative construction
of meaning. One reason for doing this, is that narrative gives structure and cohesion to
what  would  otherwise  seem  discrete,  or  isolated  events and  concepts  (as  clearly
demonstrated by Paul Ricoeur in Time and Narrative). More fundamentally, narrative is
rooted in the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schema, which is central to our bodily interaction
with the world and accordingly to most of our conceptualizations. 
37 One last point deserves to be made here. Cartoons are static pictures that have their own
internal structure and allow the representation of simultaneous interaction in space. One
look is enough to catch a synthetic view of a complex scene. But as soon as we start
describing what we see, the syntax of verbal language forces us to fragment the visual
whole into discrete elements and place them in linear sequence. The conversion of visual
into verbal data turns description into narration: ‘The church is almost empty. The priest
and the bridegroom stand waiting for the bride…’.
 
3. Image schemata
We  need  and  want  to  rebuild  the  bridge  between  perception  and  thinking.
(Arnheim 1969: 153)
38 Concept-formation, perception and interaction cannot be separated. Image schemata are
“structures for organizing our experience and comprehension” (Johnson 1987: 29). They
derive from primary sensorimotor experience and act as preconceptual structures. For
example, we use the CONTAINER schema to form the more elaborate concept of category
(e.g., IN a group, INSIDE a party).
[…] human bodily movement, manipulation of objects, and perceptual interactions
involve  recurring  patterns  without  which our  experience  would  be  chaotic  and
incomprehensible.  I  call  these patterns ‘image schemata’,  because they function
primarily as abstract structures of images. (Johnson 1987: xix)
39 Image schemata include visual schemata as well as other perceptual and interactional
modalities. Their existence remains to be established on a neurophysical basis. If this
happens, then proof will be given that motor programs play a central role in shaping
knowledge structure.
40 Image schemata have gestalt structure. However basic and simple they may seem, they
function as totalities made up of interrelated parts.
41 Image schemata are grounded in primary experience. They are abstractions formed on
the basis of our sociophysical interaction with the world.
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[…] human concepts are not just reflections of an external reality, but are crucially
shaped by our bodies and brains, especially by our sensorimotor systems. (Lakoff &
Johnson 1999: 22)
Image schemata are not “images” in the full sense:
[…] image schemata are not  rich,  concrete images or mental  pictures.  They are
structures that organize our mental representations at a level more general and
abstract that at which we form particular mental images. (Johnson 1987: 24)
42 ‘Nearer to the altar’ provides a vivid illustration of three central image schemata.
 
3.1. The SOURCE-PATH-GOAL & FROM-TO image schema 
(as described in Johnson 1987: 28-29)
43 Gestalt structure: a source point A, a terminal point B, a vector tracing a path + motion
along the path (forced, voluntary, self-propelled) + directionality
Primary experience (grounding):
44 This FROM-TO schema is  a recurrent structure manifested in a number of  seemingly
different events, such as: (a) walking from one place to another, (b) throwing a baseball to
your sister; (c) punching your brother, (d) giving your mother a present, (e) the melting
of ice into water. (Johnson 1987: 28)
45 This image schema provides a general frame for political action: Britain, metonymically
represented by Tony Blair  and the bride (£),  is  moving towards monetary union.  The
Prime Minister wants to proceed or go ahead with reform. He is now pushing things.  A
change of state is (typically) construed as a change of location. The transition from the
old to the new monetary order is understood as a short but decisive journey along a path
(i.e. the aisle). Such is the course of events…
 
3.2. The FORCE schema 
(Johnson 1987: 44-48)
46 Gestalt structure and socio-physical grounding: compulsion (being moved by an external
force like the wind,  a crowd,  etc.);  blockage (barriers that block or resist  our force);
counter-force ; removal of restraint; attraction, etc. 
47 This is  a schema which is  routinely applied to conceptualize authority.  French has a
number of phrases expressing compulsion in terms of physical forces: “pousser à”, “forcer
à”. English uses similar expressions: “forced to…”, “driven to…” (cf. Leonard Talmy’s and
Eve Sweetser’s accounts of the English modals in terms of force dynamics). In ‘Nearer to
the altar’, the Prime Minister shows his power and influence by literally pushing the bride
in the back, up “the monetary aisle”.
 
3.3. The LINK schema 
(Johnson 1987: 116-117)
48 Gestalt structure and sociophysical grounding: two distinct entities and a connection
between them. 
49 Social  relationships  like  friendships,  marriage,  diplomacy,  etc.  are  fundamentally
structured by the link schema (e.g., ‘the bonds of friendship’, ‘diplomatic ties’). Marriage,
just like monetary union, is a link [as discussed in 1.2.1.]
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 Conclusion
50 When we look,  speak,  listen,  think we rely on “cognitive configurations” (Fauconnier
1997: 189) that involve preconstructed knowledge structures (e.g., cognitive domains or
frames, scripts, image schemata) and mental operations (e.g., cross domain mappings or
blends). Since most cognitive processes operate below the level of consciousness, we may
wonder how mappings, blendings and, more generally, conceptual projections are carried
out by the brain.
51 But this may not be so important after all. The latest advances made in Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (FMRI) – a device which captures the brain in action as it engages in a
cognitive task2 – have opened more windows to the mind. Yet, in the foreseeable future,
language is likely to remain what it has always been: the most readily accessible source of
insight into the deep cognitive processes governing the sociophysical  construction of
meaning.
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NOTES
1. This paper was presented as a plenary lecture at the GERAS conference in Dijon, March 2000.
2. An area that  is  activated lights up because of  the increased blood flow.  FMRI thus allows
researchers  to  peer  inside  the  thinking  and feeling  human brain.  Knowing  where something
happens, however, does not say much about how it happens.
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